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THE PRICE OF CHEEKY CONTRACTING
PAOLO COLLA* AND MITU GULATI**
I
INTRODUCTION
“Investors like me look at contracts as akin to the user instructions that come along with
some device, like a computer or phone. The contract is a document I look at when things
go wrong; it has instructions on how to fix the problem. But [Argentina’s] lawyers . . .
they approached the contract as if they were Harry Houdini trying to get out of a box.”
- Investor in sovereign bonds, talking about Argentina’s aggressive reading of its contract
terms in its 2020 restructuring.1

It is an old adage among lawyers that contracting parties pay minimal
attention to their contract terms until faced with a crisis. Then, the parties rush
to read the terms of what they contracted for. And, to the extent there are gaps
and ambiguities in what they agreed to, choices have to be made in terms of what
meanings to assert for those gaps and ambiguities. In a severe crisis, we
hypothesize, parties will face the temptation to be particularly aggressive; a
temptation that will be tempered, possibly, by factors such as concerns about
long-term reputation. In this Article, we examine what happens when a sovereign
debtor with an already besmirched reputation faces a severe crisis and
aggressively interprets the gaps and ambiguities in its contracts. The debtor is
Argentina, and the crisis is the covid-exacerbated financial situation in 2020.
In the real world of standard-form contracting, where contract terms are
largely copied from one deal to the next, it seems plausible that the “real deal”
will sometimes vary from the “paper deal.”2 The question we ask is: Under
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1. Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Clauses and Controversies, Episode 35 ft. Ben Heller, APPLE
PODCASTS (Apr. 19, 2021), https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ep-35-ft-benheller/id1528208049?i=1000517758085 [https://perma.cc/DEC6-ZJ3J].
2. On standard-form contracting in the sovereign debt world (our focus) and elsewhere, see MITU
GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND
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conditions of contract inattention, will parties entering into contracts price their
deal differently as a function of whether the counterparty is likely to be faithful
to the real deal, or try to wring advantage by engaging in an opportunistic reading
of the paper deal?
To date, there has been little empirical investigation of the interaction
between informal trust and formal contract in the legal literature.3 To the extent
trust and contract are discussed together, it is as alternative methods of contract
enforcement: informal versus formal.4 And the question that is often asked is
whether one crowds out the other.5 Put differently, the two concepts are viewed
as substitutes rather than complements. Our Article looks to their
complementarity. Does more or less trust among parties change how the formal
contract terms get priced?
***
Scholars of investment contract design have long been interested in the
tradeoff between commitment and flexibility. Take the contracts between
dispersed investors and firm managers.6 On the one hand, investors want to give
managers discretion to make the right business decisions with their money
because the managers are the experts on this matter, and the investors are
LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 4 (2013) (discussing how lawyers working with financial contracts
are slow to implement changes to standard form contracts, even after a court has revealed its
interpretation of a term does not match what the lawyer believed it meant or will be to the detriment of
the lawyer’s client); see also Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate in M&A
Agreements: A Response to Choi, Gulati, & Scott, 67 DUKE L. J. ONLINE 219, 219 (2019) (showing how
merger and acquisition contracts often suffer from “the problem of unreflective copying of precedent
provisions”). On how the “real” can often vary from the “paper” one, see Stewart Macaulay, The Real
Deal and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge For Transparent
Simple Rules, 66 MOD. L. REV. 44, 79 (2003) (finding that “contract documents often fail to capture the
real deal between parties”). For a discussion of the Macaulay perspective and how it is at odds with how
contract law is generally taught in United States law schools, see Brian H. Bix, The Role of Contract:
Stewart Macaulay’s Lessons From Practice, in REVISITING THE SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART
MACAULAY, 241, 250–53 (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William C. Whitford ed., 2013) (noting the
differences between what students are taught and real world practices).
3. Among the exceptions are Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AMER.
SOC. REV. 55, 58 (1963) (explaining that businessmen often prefer handshake deals based off trust rather
than formal contracts); Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 561 (2015) (explaining how
sophisticated contractors can rely on trust-based relational contracting without involving the legal
system).
4. Among the articles discussing the complimentary relationship, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F.
Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory,
Practice and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1383–84 (2010) (studying the relationship and
information exchange between informal and formal contracts); Bryan McCannon, Colleen Tokar Asaad
& Mark Wilson, Contracts and Trust: Complements or Substitutes, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 811, 830–
31 (2018) (discussing the impact that trust has on contract formation and contract enforcement).
5. E.g., Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract
Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 131 (2001) (explaining that trusts “crowds
in” or “crowds out” depending on the strength of enforcement).
6. See Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1079, 1085–86 (2001)
(discussing how the tension between the conflicting interests of managers and investors impacts
decisionmaking).
THE
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dispersed and inexpert. Constraining the managers by requiring them to seek
investor approval for decisions would produce delay and inefficiency, making it
harder to compete with other firms where managerial decisions are not subject
to investors second-guessing. On the flip side, granting managers discretion to
handle investor funds produces the risk that the managers will make hasty
decisions or, worse, simply take the money and run. This risk of managerial
misbehavior militates in favor of constraining managers, or granting them less
discretion.
The question then is how to design a contract that appropriately balances the
need to give discretion, while also constraining opportunism? The question is
thorny because increased discretion for managers produces greater temptation
to act opportunistically. Among the features that scholars have suggested solve
the circularity between commitment and flexibility in the real world are extracontractual characteristics such as trust and reputation. If the managers in
question are repeat players with reputational capital at stake, then they can be
trusted more. Or if the managers come from the same small insular community
as the investors, the fear of community shaming might constrain misbehavior.7
In the area of government financing, the commitment versus flexibility
problem is stark. In the case of countries that are dependent on foreign financing,
investors will necessarily be dispersed, inexpert about local conditions, and illequipped to police the behavior of local actors. In such a situation, when a
financial crisis hits a sovereign borrower, the investors would likely benefit by
allowing local government officials the discretion to make quick decisions to
handle the crisis—including the discretion to do things like putting a hold on
creditor payments––until the crisis has abated. By contrast, if such decisions
could only be taken after obtaining the agreement of a supermajority of
creditors—say, 90%––the decision would take time to be made and would be at
risk of being held hostage by holdouts. The problem, though, is that giving
government officials unfettered discretion to make quick and unilateral decisions
on debt relief creates the risk that those government officials will utilize that
discretion to curry favor with their local constituents, who might like the lower
tax payments that result from having to pay creditors less.8 That is, officials may
claim the existence of a crisis that calls for the reduction of the amounts owed to
creditors, even when the situation does not call for such extreme measures. In
line with the conjecture about how trust and reputation can help determine the
appropriate balance between commitment and flexibility, one might predict that
countries that borrow heavily, and have built up reputational capital, will be given
7. For an overview of the literature, see Sadie Blanchard, Contracts Without Court or Clans: How
Business Networks Govern Exchange 11 (July 1, 2021) (unpublished manuscript Notre Dame Law
School), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3780925 [https://perma.cc/MX5E-UDT4]
(explaining that insular communities may boycott a member who wrongs another person in the
community).
8. See Michael Bradley, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Irving De Lira, Salvatiera & Mitu Gulati, Pricing
Sovereign Debt: Foreign Versus Local Parameters, 24 EUR. FIN. MGT. 261, 265 (2018) (examining the
commitment versus flexibility tradeoff with foreign versus local parameter debt).
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more leeway by investors. In contrast, countries who borrow less and with less
reputational capital at stake will be subject to greater contractual constraints.
At the extremes, this is what we see. Large borrowers with positive
reputational capital such as the US, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and Japan
borrow under contracts that essentially allow the debtor to do whatever it wants.
By contrast, emerging market nations, such as Ecuador and Argentina, who are
poorer, borrow less, and have a history of default, borrow under lengthy, detailed
contracts that constrain the debtor’s ability to act unilaterally in a debt crisis visà-vis creditor claims, or to claim that there is such a crisis in the first place.9
In a world without transaction costs, one might conjecture from the foregoing
discussion that countries that show themselves to be more trustworthy will get
offered contracts with greater flexibility, and those that have demonstrated bad
behavior in the past will have to agree to greater commitment.10 While true at the
extremes, this is not the case within categories of borrowers who are all
constrained by market convention to use the same boilerplate provisions, such as
the world of emerging market sovereign borrowers. So, while Chile might have
demonstrated a strong commitment to repaying its external debts, no matter what
the domestic costs, it has to use the same basic contract terms as Argentina, a
nation that some might say has demonstrated little commitment to repaying its
foreign debt. The question then is what happens to the commitment versus
flexibility tradeoff when all debtors use standard forms, but have shown differing
indicia of trustworthiness? The answer, economic logic tells us, should come
through the price mechanism. At a predetermined commitment-flexibility point,
debtors that are more trustworthy should pay less to borrow than those that are
less trustworthy. But do they?11 Do we see the cost of debt increasing for debtors
who have shown themselves to be less trustworthy?
To analyze the foregoing question, we use the perennial “bad boy” of the
international debt markets: the Republic of Argentina.12 Argentina has not only
been a serial defaulter, but has long been known for its aggressive behavior visà-vis creditors in fighting creditor claims.13 Below are some recent highlights, that

9. Id.
10. See Barry Eichengreen, Kenneth Kletzer & Ashoka Mody, Crisis Resolution: Next Steps, in
BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 2003 279, 294 (2004) (exploring the commitment versus flexibility tradeoff);
Jason Roderick Donaldson, Lukas Kremens & Giorgia Piacentino, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
Commitment
Versus
Flexibility
3
(2021)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3761293 [https://perma.cc/86VD-NY63] (similar).
11. For a skeptical view, see Jeffrey Lipshaw, Trust Versus Law (in a Box): Do Organizational Forms
Really Make a Difference?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1796, 1801, 1811 (2014) (noting the difficulty of
incorporating trust, a noncalculable metric, into an economic model).
12. On Argentina’s “bad boy” status, see Anna Szymanski, Opportunity Cost: Argentina Remains
the Bad Boy of Sovereign Debt, REUTERS (July 14, 2020), https://www.breakingviews.com/consideredview/argentina-remains-the-bad-boy-of-sovereign-debt/ [https://perma.cc/FP72-4PPJ].
13. For a history of the last two centuries of sovereign borrowing and the serial defaulters over that
period, see generally Carmen Reinhart, Christoph Trebesch & Josefin Meyer, Sovereign Bonds Since
Waterloo,
(Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
25543,
2019),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25543 [https://perma.cc/C8CE-ACNM] (analyzing historical rates of
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no other sovereign borrower can compete with.
• In 2013, in litigation against unpaid creditors from its 2001 default, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals described Argentina as a “uniquely
recalcitrant debtor” and went so far as to use its equity powers to
shape a special remedy to force it to pay creditors.14
• In 2019 and 2020, Argentina found itself in litigation for its refusal to
pay on a set of GDP-linked instruments that it had issued in 2005 and
2010. The instruments paid out more when Argentina’s GDP was
higher. Investors, however, alleged that Argentina had fudged its
GDP numbers in some years, which then resulted in it not having to
pay out on the GDP warrants.15 In 2021, Argentina, for its part, argued
that the contracts granted it discretion to decide on how to report the
GDP numbers. Ruling in 2021, however, a federal judge in New York
determined there were enough facts alleged by the investors that
there was a plausible case Argentina had acted in bad faith.16
• In 2020, mired in crisis and faced with the need to restructure its debt
again, Argentina arguably showed its colors again. This time, the
supposed bad behavior was in its aggressive use of a new set of clauses
intended to enable sovereigns to restructure their debt quickly,
without undue vulnerability to holdout creditors––so-called
“Collective Action Clauses” or “CACs.” Argentina, seeking to deter
holdouts, unveiled two new strategies dubbed Pac Man and Re–
designation. Many investors, including some who had participated in
the drafting of these clauses, however, saw these as constituting bad
faith.17 Or, quoting Reuters reporter Anna Szymanksi, “cheeky”
returns on sovereign debt).
14. For discussion of Argentina’s misbehavior as a debtor, see, e.g., Laura Alfaro, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: Evaluating the Impact of the Argentina Ruling, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 48, 49 (2015)
(referring to Argentina’s poor reputation from conducting bad-faith negotiations with creditors); Arturo
C. Porcezanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 311, 317 (2005) (noting Argentina’s long standing bad reputation as a debtor).
15. See Argentina Fails in Bid to Halt 645 mln Euro UK Lawsuit Over GDP Warrants, REUTERS
(July 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-argentina-court/argentina-fails-in-bid-to-halt645-mln-euro-uk-lawsuit-over-gdp-warrants-idUSL5N2ET61I [https://perma.cc/BUC9-S6CP]
(describing a lawsuit where Argentina is accused of manipulating financial data); Bob Van Voris,
Carolina Millan & Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez, Suing Argentina Over Debt (Again), Aurelius Claims $84
Million, BLOOMBERGQUINT (Jan 14, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0114/aurelius-capital-sues-argentina-over-gdp-linked-securities?sref=wvo74VD0 [https://perma.cc/VK9SMBMY] (noting allegations that Argentina failed to properly calculate payments). Argentina had
previously gotten into trouble with the International Monetary Fund for fudging GDP numbers. See IMF
Says Argentine Economic Data Still Flawed, Extends Review For a Year, REUTERS (June 3, 2015),
https://www.reuters.com/article/argentina-imf/imf-says-argentine-economic-data-still-flawed-extendsreview-for-a-year-idUSL1N0YO2PL20150603
[https://perma.cc/N2AL-PJNF]
(explaining
that
Argentina has failed to improve the quality of their statistics).
16. See Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 1:19-cv-00351-LAP (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2021) (describing the judge’s decision to deny Argentina’s motion to dismiss against allegations
of impromper calculations).
17. Investor ire on this matter was widely reported. See Colby Smith, Autonomy Hedge Fund
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contracting.18
We are interested in whether—and, if so, how—the trustworthiness of a
contractual counterparty affects the pricing of contract terms. To examine this,
we look at a contract term that, if used cooperatively, can benefit all the parties
involved, but which also allows for the possibility of opportunistic use. In the next
section, we provide the background on the specific contract term, the Collective
Action Clause (CAC), whose pricing we study.
II
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
The basics of the Collective Action Clause are simple. The CAC sets out the
conditions under which a group of creditors will grant the sovereign debt relief.
So, the CAC could say that a 100% vote of the creditors is required to alter the
provisions of the debt contract, or it could require the support of 85% or 75%.
There will typically also be other bells and whistles in that the vote required to
alter payment terms—e.g., the amount owed and time and currency of payment—
might be higher than the vote required to alter less crucial terms—e.g., the
negative pledge clause. For example, the former might be 75% and the latter
50%. And, for purely ministerial matters that have no material impact on the
investors, the sovereign issuer and the trustee—the bondholder representative—
might be able to make the changes without any need for a creditor vote. There
might also be restrictions on whether the affiliates of the issuer—e.g., the central
bank—can vote its holdings.
This simple clause—at its core, a vote requirement—has been the topic of
Bemoans
Argentina’s
‘Bad
Faith’
Tactics,
FIN.
TIMES
(June
30,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/5b9d712f-e349-4a53-8a2d-0c7a9bc52214
[https://perma.cc/XHV8-RUUS]
(noting that some investors claiming these strategies as a “flagrant abuse” of the contractual terms);
Argentina and the Bad Pac Man, SLATE MONEY (July 25, 2020), https://slate.com/podcasts/slatemoney/2020/07/argentina-sovereign-debt-crisis [https://perma.cc/YT4S-VFVV] (reporting investor’s
unhappiness with Argentina’s dealings); Buttonwood, Hell is Other Bondholders, ECONOMIST (Aug. 29,
2020), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/08/29/for-fixed-income-investors-hell-isother-bondholders [https://perma.cc/GL8L-7ZJL] (highlighting that creditors immediately complained
when learning of Argentina’s strategy); Scott Squires, Jorgelina Do Rosario & Carolina Milan, Argentina
Creditors Seek Foreign Backing On Debt Clauses, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-01/argentina-creditors-seek-international-backingon-debt-clauses?sref=wvo74VD0 [https://perma.cc/8YVK-YANX] (describing investor ire with
Argentina’s use of Pac-man tactics); Anna Gelpern, Keeping Cosy By The Dumpster Fire: Argentina
Reads Its Contracts . . . Twice . . . Quel Scandale!, CREDIT SLIPS (June 10, 2020),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/06/keeping-cosy-by-the-dumpster-fire-argentina-reads-itscontracts-quel-scandale.html [https://perma.cc/5FR3-L3WK] (examining the investor outrage created by
Argentina’s strategy); cf. Mark Sobel, Argentina And Its Creditors Enter a New Round, OMFIF FORUM
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.omfif.org/2020/06/argentina-and-creditors-enter-new-round/
[https://perma.cc/72PP-ANKF] (one of the architects of the 2014 CACs, former United States Under
Secretary of the Treasury, expresses concern about the Argentine negotiations and the use of CACs
there).
18. Anna Szymanski, Argentina Gets Too Cheeky With its Creditors, REUTERS BREAKING VIEWS
(June 8, 2020), https://www.breakingviews.com/considered-view/argentina-gets-too-cheeky-with-itscreditors/ [https://perma.cc/P36Q-YJX3].
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attention from scholars and policy makers for many years because Official Sector
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the United States
Treasury, and the European Central Bank, have worried that the modification
terms that private creditors and sovereign debtors tend to agree on in their
contracts often unduly constrain the ability of sovereigns to restructure quickly
in the event of a crisis. In the 1990s bond market, this concern was particularly
salient because the vote to change payment terms required unanimity—which
meant that bonds, with thousands of dispersed creditors, were essentially
impossible to restructure.19 That constraint then puts pressure on the Official
Sector, given its concerns about spillover effects from a sovereign crisis, to
provide bailouts to ameliorate the problem.20 In other words, there is a moral
hazard problem. Official institutions, therefore, have urged on multiple occasions
that sovereigns and their creditors revise their contract terms to make
restructurings easier and less susceptible to holdout problems.21 Specifically, they
have urged the reduction of the vote requirements on the standard form
collective action clauses––for example, from 100% to 75%. The response from
critics has been that making restructurings easier will lead to greater
opportunistic behavior on the part of debtors and that, in turn, will raise the cost
of capital.22
Under pressure from the Official Sector, sovereign debtors and creditors have
agreed twice over the past two decades, in 2003 and 2014, to revise their standard
forms to include increasingly restructuring-friendly CACs. Specifically, the
voting thresholds, in terms of how much creditor approval was required, have
been reduced twice, both times making it easier for sovereigns to restructure their
debts. The first time, in 2003, the vote requirement in individual bonds for a
restructuring decision to be binding was reduced from 100% to 75%.23 And the
second time, the requirement of obtaining a 75% vote in each individual bond
was relaxed to also allow a restructuring vote to be binding if either the proposal
received 66.67% of the votes across all the bonds being aggregated and at least
50% approval in each individual bond or just a 75% vote across all the bonds in
19. See Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L. J.
1317, 1329–30, 1335, 1341–45 (2004) (noting that a unanimity requirement frustrates the ability to
restructure).
20. “Official Sector” is the term used in the sovereign debt industry for the official institutions that
help govern it, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. See Lee C. Buchheit, The
Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333, 338–39 (2005) (discussing
the history of the official sector’s role in soverign debt).
21. For histories of these initiatives, see Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, The Argentine Collective
Action Clause Controversy, 15 CAP. MKTS L. J. 464, 464–69 (2020) (examining the evolution of CACs);
see generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54
VA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (outlining the evolution of CACs).
22. For a discussion of the theory, see generally Sayantan Ghosal & Kannika Thampanshivong, Does
Strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) Help?, 89 J. INT’L ECON. 68 (2013) (discussing the
relationship between creditor coordination and both interim and ex ante efficient CAC thresholds). Real
world participants had similar concerns. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private
Contract, 54 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1648–707 (2006) (reporting on interviews with key players).
23. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 21, at 465–67.
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aggregate, with no requirement for any individual bond.24
The empirical question on each of these occasions has been: Did the shift to
the restructuring friendly clauses—more flexibility and less commitment—
produce an increase in the cost of capital as initially predicted by the critics of the
CAC initiatives?
Looking over the range of CAC studies, most have failed to find evidence of
a pricing penalty from the reduction in voting thresholds. Instead, studies
generally either find a pricing benefit (the cost of borrowing for the sovereign
decreases) from using CACs or no effect.25 That is, investors seem to perceive a
benefit from making it easier for the debtor to reduce how much it owes those
investors (more flexibility/less commitment)—at first cut, a counterintuitive
result.26
One explanation for the puzzling result has to do with the interaction of trust
with contract. Sovereign issuers, the story goes, are repeat players in the
borrowing market. That means that they can generally be trusted to not act
opportunistically. That is, to not ask for a restructuring when the issuer is still
able to make payments and to not take advantage of a contract term in a fashion
that the parties did not foresee at the start; not even if the literal terms of the
contract allow for that reading.27 Under such conditions, the primary effect of a
reduced voting threshold will be to help reduce the risk of a creditor’s holdout
disrupting a restructuring, which in turn should result in cost reduction for the
majority of creditors and the issuer.28 That then explains why the majority of
24. The fractional vote requirement is a function of the principal amount. See New ICMA Collective
Action
Clauses, CLIFFORD CHANCE 3–4 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2014/10/new-icma-sovereigncollective-action-and-pari-passu-clauses.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9UA-366Q] (discussing two limb voting
mechanics).
25. See generally Kay Chung & Michael G. Papaioannou, Do Enhanced Collective Action Clauses
Affect Sovereign Borrowing Costs? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 20, 2020) (discussing
whether CACs affect sovereign bond prices); Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, Steven Ongena & Mitu Gulati,
The Price of Law, REV. FIN. STUDS. (2020) (analyzing price effects and other related phenomena due to
the rise of CAC clauses); Mattia Picarelli, Aitor Erce & Jiang Xu, The Benefits of Reducing Holdout Risk:
Evidence From the Euro CAC Experiment, 2013–2018, 14 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 155 (2019) (evaluating the
price impacts of “mandatory two-limb CACs”); Christoph Grosse Steffen, Sebastian Grund & Julian
Schumacher, Collective Action Clauses in the Euro Area: A Law and Economics Analysis of the First Five
Years, 14 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 134 (2019) (outlining the timeline of CAC incorporation and its limited effects
on the price of bonds); Alfredo Bardozetti & Davide Dottori, Collective Action Clauses: How do They
Affect Sovereign Bond Yields? 92 J. INT’L ECON. 286 (2014) (finding price effects of CACs, but with
differences in the effects for different categories of bonds); Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective
Action Clauses for the Eurozone, 18 REV. OF FIN. 2045 (2013) (finding that CACs reduce the cost of
capital for lower rated sovereign issuers); Torbjörn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen,
Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? 61 J. INT’L ECON. 127
(2003) (fnding little effect of CACs on bond prices).
26. It is counterintuitive, until one accepts that financial distress is always a multilateral problem.
That is, creditor versus creditor and not just creditor versus debtor.
27. See Carletti et al., supra note 25, at 5938 (suggesting that the risk of strategic default by
sovereigns with some degree of trustworthiness is relatively low and generally outweighed by the benefits
of more orderly credit coordination from the use of CACs).
28. Id. at 5943.
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studies do not find negative pricing effects from creditors giving debtors greater
flexibility to ask for debt reductions.
In prior research examining the adoption of CACs by Euro area sovereigns
in 2013, we found this result, and so do other researchers.29 For Euro area nations,
we found overall that reducing the vote required to alter payment terms from
100% to a supermajority requirement—that is, the CAC—reduced the cost of
capital.30 More important for our current inquiry, we also found that sovereigns
less likely to act opportunistically, other things equal, received a higher pricing
benefit for including CACs in their bonds.31
The prior study, however, examined a set of sovereigns who were all relatively
high on the trust scale.32 The question we consider is the effect of reducing voting
thresholds for a country that is low on the trust scale; one that has a track record
of acting opportunistically. We should, in such circumstances, see the flip of the
result we found for Euro area sovereigns: a negative price effect.
We find some indication of a negative price effect in a study of Venezuelan
bond prices in 2016. Venezuela, to give some context, is a frequent defaulter and
had a government in place with an unsavory reputation.33 And we found, for data
from 2016, that bonds with higher vote thresholds, harder to restructure, were
priced higher than the ones with lower vote thresholds, easier to restructure.34 In
other words, the opposite pricing result as that from the Euro area study for a set
of high-trust issuers. The sample of bonds in the Venezuela study, however,
varied not just in terms of their CACs, but also another important contract term,
the pari passu clause.35
Argentina, in 2020, presents an empirically cleaner opportunity to examine
CAC pricing for an unsavory debtor. As noted earlier, under pressure from the
29. Carletti et al., supra note 25; Picarelli, supra note 25; Grosse Steffen et al., supra note 25.
30. Carletti et al., supra note 25; Picarelli et al., supra note 25.
31. Carletti et al., supra note 25.
32. See id. (constructing the scale using measures of trustworthiness from a number of public sources
such as the World Bank’s “Doing Business” index of countries).
33. This being the government of Nicholas Maduro, currently under international sanctions. For
discussion of its unsavory character, see Robin Wigglesworth, Venezuela Crisis Raises Talk of ‘Odious
Debt’ Doctrine, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/fa6850cc-96c3-11e7-b83c9588e51488a0 [https://perma.cc/5JVK-VLJX].
34. See generally Carletti et al., supra note 25 (studying the yield differential between CAC bonds
and otherwise similar no-CAC bonds).
35. There are prior CAC studies that have examined pricing effects across a range of issuers, ranging
from poor to rich. However, these studies—the first generation of CAC studies—were done with crosssectional data across countries, where researchers had to make heroic assumptions about how they had
managed to control for the myriad differences in the contracts and issuers other than the CAC term. And
the findings vary. Some find that the reduction of voting thresholds results in a price penalty for the
nations with low credit ratings, but a price benefit for those with high ones. Others find no effects across
the range of sovereigns. Some find price benefits for the low credit rating nations, but few for the high
ones. And one study found a U shaped curve with negative effects for the sovereigns in the middle range
of ratings. For the varying bottom lines, see generally Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Do Collective
Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?, 114 ECONOMIC J. 247 (2004) (comparing bond spreads); Bradley
et al., supra note 25 (discussing the impact of CAC clauses on the cost of capital); Becker et al., supra
note 25 (examining the cost effects of CAC clauses); Bardozzetti & Dottori, supra note 25 (same).
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Official Sector, almost all sovereigns switched to using a new type of CAC in mid
to late 2014.36 A number of the sovereigns who switched to the new CACs,
though, still had outstanding bonds, issued earlier in time, that had the prior
generation of CACs. That then produced a situation where sovereigns such as
Argentina simultaneously had bonds trading that had two different types of
CACs: easier-to-restructure and harder-to-restructure. In Argentina’s case, the
situation was unusually good for purposes of an empirical test because it retained
the differential in CACs even after it did its restructuring in 2020. Put differently,
restructured bonds that had older CACs—we term them Kirchner CACs, after
Christina Kirchner, the president under whom they were issued—and
restructured bonds that had newer CACs—Macri CACs, after Mauricio Macri,
the next president—both kept their original CACs even after the restructuring.37
Other than this one CAC type difference, though, these Kirchner and Macri
bonds were identical in substantive legal terms like pari passu, negative pledge,
and cross defaults. That then sets up a situation where we can compare Argentine
bonds with Kirchner CACs, which should be harder to restructure, to Argentine
bonds with Macri CACs, which should be easier to restructure, in the lead up to
the restructuring and in the period immediately after the restructuring.38 To
reiterate then, unlike in the case of the Venezuelan study mentioned above, the
only salient legal contract difference in these bonds is the type of CAC.
III
EMPIRICAL TESTS
This section reports on our empirical analysis of two sets of Argentine bonds,
Kirchner and Macri, that are identical in all of their substantive contract terms,
except for some differences in the financial terms—e.g., maturity, coupons,
principal amounts, and callability—and one legal term, the CACs. The CACs in

36. For the most recent data on this, see generally INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Fourth
Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond
Contracts 3–4 (2019), https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/PP/2019/PPEA2019008.ashx
[https://perma.cc/RY79-8RY8] (describing the prevalence of enhanced CACs in sovereign bonds).
37. We are unaware of any other sovereign debt restructuring where the holders, after the
restructuring, kept their pre-restructuring contract terms. But, with Argentina in 2020, the story we have
heard from insiders involved in the negotiations is that holders who had stronger contract terms going in
to the restructuring refused to have them weakened. The holders with already weaker terms though, were
willing to stay with their weaker terms post restructuring.
38. This feature is explicated in the disclosures mandated by the US Securities and Exchange
Commission for the bonds in question. The relevant public documents are publicly available both on
EDGAR (the SEC’s disclosure system) and the website of the Luxembourg exchange, where the bonds
are listed. Description of the Republic of Argentina, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/914021/000119312520275311/d29083dex99d.htm
[https://perma.cc/SEX4-XVDQ];
Argentina
(The
Republic
of),
LUX. STOCK EXCH.,
https://www.bourse.lu/issuer/Argentina/28543 [https://perma.cc/W3FV-P3V6]; see also Sebastian Grund,
Restructuring Argentina’s Sovereign Debt, COLUMBIA BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/12/03/restructuring-argentinas-sovereign-debt-navigating-thelegal-labyrinth/ [https://perma.cc/ML5W-JP42] (noting the same differences in bond contract terms).
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the Kirchner bonds require higher voting thresholds to be met to be restructured
than do the Macri bonds. To the extent we can control for differences in the
financial terms, this allows us to examine the differential pricing effect of the one
legal difference between the Kirchner and the Macri bonds. That is, the
differences in the CACs. If there are pricing differences, that suggests that the
market is cognizant of the contractual differences.
We are interested in whether the pattern we see in terms of the pricing
difference will be different here than what has been found in prior pricing studies.
Prior studies of Euro area sovereign bonds described above found that the
harder-to-restructure bonds had lower prices than the easier-to-restructure ones.
The explanation for this counterintuitive result was that Euro area sovereign
issuers—all very concerned with maintaining their good reputations and
constrained by institutions such as the European Central Bank—were only ever
going to use the power to restructure when they needed to solve a holdout
problem. Put differently, they were not likely to use that power to restructure
opportunistically, by paying back only a fraction of what they borrowed even
when they had the ability to repay in full. Consistent with that conjecture, when
the CAC pricing differential among the different European countries was
examined, we found that the size of the differential between harder–to–
restructure and easier-to-restructure bonds was smaller for countries that scored
lower on an index of relative trustworthiness of nations.39
The aforementioned European nations though were all high on the trust scale
to start with. The natural question then was whether, if we went far down the
trust scale—to a bad actor sovereign issuer like Argentina—the differential could
go so far down that the sign on the differential might flip. Would harder-torestructure bonds now show a higher price than easier-to-restructure ones?
For readers who would prefer to skip the econometric analysis that follows
and jump to the punch line: the sign does flip.40
As explained more fully in the next part, we examine sets of Argentine bonds
in two scenarios: during a severe debt crisis and prior to restructuring, and after
the debt crisis, when a new restructuring was unlikely to be offing in the near
future. The sign flips in both scenarios, except for a short window of time
immediately after the restructuring, when the differential hovers around zero.

39. See supra Part II (discussing the study results).
40. A point to re-emphasize here is that the legal contract terms of the bonds remained the same
before and after the restructuring. That is, bonds that had Kirchner (harder to restructure) terms before
the restructuring in 2020 kept their Kirchner terms. And bonds that had Macri terms (easier to
restructure) before the restructuring continued to have the same terms afterwards as well. The
restructurings did not alter the CACs, themselves.
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IV
DATA
The Republic of Argentina announced on August 31, 2020 that, as part of its
bond exchange offer:
[I]t has obtained the consents required to exchange and or modify 99.01% of the
aggregate principal amount outstanding of all series of eligible bonds issued under the
2005 Indenture . . . and 2016 Indenture . . . pursuant to the terms of its invitation . . .
described in the prospectus supplement dated April 21, 2020, as most recently amended
and restated on August 17, 2020.41

The eligible bonds were denominated in USD, EUR, and CHF. The principal
amount that consented to the proposed modifications totaled $59,735 million out
of $63,376 million. As a result of the exchange offer, on September 4, 2020,
Argentina issued twelve new bonds (six USD denominated and six EUR
denominated42) with maturities ranging from 2029 to 2046. The debt restructuring
pushed debt amortizations to 2024 and beyond and reduced interest payments.
The total amount issued with these securities was $68,161 million, which
corresponds to about 20% of Argentina’s total government debt ($332.2 billion
in Q3 2020). Table 1-Panel A summarizes the main characteristics of the newly
issued USD denominated bonds (henceforth “after-exchange-bonds”). With the
sole exception of the 2029 maturity, a fixed coupon bond, all the other bonds are
step-up with coupon rates that increase over the securities’ lifecycle according to
a predefined schedule.43

41. The Argentine Republic Announces the Results of the Exchange of External Public Debt under
Foreign Law, ARGENTINA.GOB.AR (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.economia.gob.ar/en/the-argentinerepublic-announces-the-results-of-the-exchange-of-external-public-debt-under-foreign-law/
[https://perma.cc/5YKE-Z43D].
42. After-exchange-bonds are “twin-currencies” in that, for a given maturity, Argentina issued a
USD- and a EUR-denominated bond. EUR-denominated bonds represent a small fraction of the total
issued amount of about 7.5% (about 5,000 million using the EUR/USD exchange rate on September 4,
2020). We therefore focus on USD-denominated bonds which constitute the lion’s share of newly issued
government securities.
43. Coupon payments are semi-annual with a long first coupon paid in July 2021. Amortization plans
are pro-rata in that an identical fraction of the (original) principal amount is paid to creditors at each
reimbursement date. The 2029 maturity amortizes in 10 installments starting January 2025; the 2030
maturity amortizes in 13 installments starting July 2024; the 2035 maturity amortizes in 10 installments
starting January 2031; the 2038 maturity amortizes in 22 installments starting July 2027; the 2041 maturity
amortizes in 28 installments starting January 2028; the 2046 maturity amortizes in 44 installments starting
January 2025.
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Panel A: after-exchange-bonds
ISIN

Issue

Maturity

US040114HX11
US040114HS26

04/09/2020
04/09/2020

07/09/2029
07/09/2030

Coupon
Type
Fix
Step-up

US040114HT09

04/09/2020

07/09/2035

Step-up

US040114HU71

04/09/2020

01/09/2038

Step-up

US040114HV54

04/09/2020

07/09/2041

Step-up

US040114HW38

04/09/2020

07/09/2046

Step-up

Coupon
Rate
1.000
0.1251.750
0.1255.000
0.1255.000
0.1254.875
0.1255.000

Amount

Indenture

2,635.03
16,090.61

Macri
Macri

20,501.72

Macri

11,405.07

Kirchner

10,482.11

Kirchner

2,092.00

Macri

63,206.53
Panel B: before-exchange-bonds
ISIN

Issue

Maturity

US040114GW47*
US040114HK99*
US040114HP86
US040114GX20*
US040114HL72*
US040114HQ69
US040114HF05*
US040114GL81*
US040114HG87*
US040114GK09

04/12/2017
04/18/2017
01/11/2018
04/18/2017
04/12/2017
1/11/2018
04/12/2017
12/31/2003
04/12/2017
06/02/2005

04/22/2021
01/26/2022
01/11/2023
04/22/2026
01/26/2027
01/11/2028
07/06/2028
12/31/2033
07/06/2036
12/31/2038

Coupon
Type
Fix
Fix
Fix
Fix
Fix
Fix
Fix
Fix
Fix
Step-up

US040114GY03
US040114HR43
USP04808AN44*

04/12/2017
1/11/2018
6/28/2017

04/22/2046
1/11/2048
6/28/2117

Fix
Fix
Fix

Coupon
Rate
6.875
5.625
4.635
7.50
6.875
5.875
6.625
8.280
7.125
1.3303.750
7.625
6.875
7.125

Amount

Indenture

4,484
3,250
1,750
6,454.85
3,750.00
4,250
965.00
5,092.46
1,727.00
4,938.66

Macri
Macri
Macri
Macri
Macri
Macri
Macri
Kirchner
Macri
Kirchner

2,617.69
Macri
3,000
Macri
2,689,18
Macri
44,968.83
Table 1. Bond characteristics. Annual coupon rate is in %. For step-up bonds the first
number is the first coupon (to be paid in July 2021 for the after-exchange bonds and paid
on September 30, 2005 for US040114GK09) and the second number is the highest coupon
rate. Amount is in USD MM. * indicates multiple ISINs: amount aggregated across
multiple ISINs. Bonds in italics are those used in our empirical analyses.

All the after-exchange-bonds contain CAC provisions regarding future
modifications to their terms. Yet these provisions differ across bonds in cases
where the proposed modifications would affect two, or more, bond series.
Specifically, the 2038 and 2041 bonds—”2005 Indenture new bonds”—require
the consent of more than 85% of the aggregate principal across all series affected
and/or more than 66 2/3% of the aggregate principal of each series. By contrast,
the 2029, 2030, 2035, and 2046 bonds—”2016 Indenture new bonds”—require the
consent of more than 66 2/3% of the aggregate principal across all series affected

GULATI (DO NOT DELETE)

112

4/24/2022 9:55 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 85: 99

and/or more than 50% of the aggregate principal of each series. The
heterogeneity in legal terms across indentures is identical to that of the “beforeexchange-bonds,” those that got exchanged at the beginning of September 2020.
As noted above, we refer to these different sets of legal terms and the bonds that
contain them as Kirchner and Macri, respectively, after the presidents who were
in power when the bonds were issued. Key to keep in mind is that the Kirchner
bonds required a higher vote to be satisfied before a restructuring can be
universally binding than the Macri ones required, making the former harder to
restructure and the latter easier. The characteristics of the USD denominated
before-exchange-bonds are summarized in Table 1-Panel B.44
Note that Kirchner bonds have relatively long tenors, 2033 and 2038 before
exchange, and 2038 and 2041 after exchange, while the maturity structure for
Macri bonds is more dispersed, with expirations ranging from 2021 to 2117 before
exchange and from 2029 to 2046 after exchange. The term structure of bond
yields—as well as yield spreads— is, overall, inverted for the Argentinian bonds
during our sample period, consistent with the documented feature for sovereign
debtors in financial (dis)stress45: Yields and yield spreads on shorter maturities
are larger than those for bonds with longer tenors. Making use of the entire set
of Macri bonds would therefore bias us towards finding a negative yield
differential associated with Kirchner bonds since the vast majority of Macri
bonds have shorter tenors than Kirchner bonds. Therefore, in our study, we
include a smaller set of Macri bonds: three before-exchange-bonds and two afterexchange-bonds, indicated in italics in Table 1. These Macri bonds have the
closest maturities to those of Kirchner bonds.46 The goal is to compare bonds that
have similar maturity risk. Overall, the maturity differential between Kirchner
and this restricted set of Macri bonds ranges between two and five years. The
average maturity of Kirchner bonds is about fifteen years before exchange and
twenty years after exchange.
We collect from Refinitiv daily zero-volatility spreads (Z-spreads47), as well
44. The exchange offer involved EUR- and CHF-denominated bonds with an outstanding amount
of $18,407 million ($6,677 million with Macri indentures and $11,729 million with Kirchner indentures).
Holders of these series could opt for USD-denominated bonds.
45. See generally Juan M. Sanchez, Horacio Sapriza & Emircan Yurdagul, Sovereign Default and
Maturity Choice, 95 J. MONETARY ECON. 72 (2018) (describing a model of sovereign debt maturity and
the term structure of interest rate spreads).
46. An alternative would be to include all bonds and to control (parametrically) for the dependence
of bond valuations on residual maturity. Yet the best models in fitting the term structure of bond yields
typically include at least three terms and thus require a large set of cross-sectional units. Given the
scarcity of bonds we can use–especially after the exchange offer, where there are at most six bonds–we
opt for reducing the number of bonds instead in order to have similar maturities across Kirchner and
Macri bonds.
47. The Z-spread is the constant spread that has to be added to the (currency-matched) swapderived zero curve to obtain the current bond (bid) price. Z-spreads constitute an alternative to yield
spreads to quantify the additional risk a bond bears as compared to a risk-free alternative. While yield
spreads assume that all future cash flows are discounted at the same rate—as the spread is measured at
a specific point on the yield curve—Z-spreads take into account that payments occurring at different
points in time are discounted at different rates. See MOORAD CHOUDHRY ET AL., CAPITAL MARKET
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as other data fields described below, for the before-exchange-bonds from
December 10, 2019—when Alberto Fernandez takes office—to July 17, 2020, two
weeks after the fourth and last restructuring proposal. That gives us a total of 159
trading days.
For the after-exchange-bonds, our sample period ranges from September 14,
2020—two weeks after the exchange offer—to June 4, 2021 for a total of 187
trading days. All the after-exchange-bonds are callable. Holders of callable bonds
are long a non-callable bond and short a call option. The embedded option makes
callable bonds trade at lower prices and higher yields than non-callable bonds.
For the after-exchange-bonds, we use the option-adjusted spread which nets out
prepayment risk,48 and is therefore the right metric to compare with the Z–spread
for the non-callable before-exchange-bonds. We hereafter refer to these Zspreads for before-exchange-bonds and option-adjusted spreads for afterexchange-bonds as our bonds’ spreads.
To mitigate the effect of outliers, spreads are winsorized, at the bond level, at
the nintey-fifth percentile. Descriptive statistics – means, medians, first and third
quartile – for bond spreads are portrayed in Figure 1. The figure reveals that
spreads are, overall, lower and less volatile for after-exchange-bonds.

INSTRUMENTS: ANALYSIS AND VALUATION 150–58 (3d ed. 2010). Given the heterogeneity in our bonds’
payment structure, we therefore opt for Z-spreads in lieu of yield spreads in order to measure credit risk
more accurately.
48. This is given by the difference between the zero-volatility spread and the option-adjusted spread.
Prepayment risk turns out to be of little economic relevance for our sample bonds in that prepayment
risk, as a fraction of a bond’s yield, ranges between 2.5% and 6.25%. This is consistent with a low
likelihood that the Argentinian government will repay the bonds to refinance at better terms. More
generally, on how these issuer call provisions are set deep out of the money and are unlikely to ever be
triggered, see generally Ugo Panizza & Mitu Gulati, Make-Wholes in Sovereign Bonds, 16 CAP. MKTS. L.
J. 267 (2021) (examining sovereign bond “make-whole” provisions).
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Figure 1. Bond spreads/1. The figure displays descriptive statistics of bond spreads:
average (black circles), median, first and third quartile for Kirchner (dark grey) and
Macri (light grey) bonds. Bond spreads are Z-spreads for before-exchange bonds (left
panel) and option-adjusted spreads for after-exchange bonds (right panel).

Figure 2 plots the time series of equally weighted average spreads for the
Kirchner—harder to restructure—and Macri—easier to restructure—bonds. In
reading Figure 2, it is helpful to keep an important feature of sovereign bond
restructurings in mind. The norm in sovereign restructurings is that all bonds of
the same type—for example, foreign currency, foreign law, maturity greater than
a year—receive the same offer, regardless of their legal terms—for example,
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CACs. That is what was expected in Argentina and what happened. Any pricing
difference, therefore, is a function of differential expectations about whether the
debtor will be able to force that offer on to one group of bondholders versus
another—which the lower vote threshold in Macri-vintage CACs makes more
likely.
Focusing now on Figure 2, we see that bond spreads are relatively stable at
the beginning of the sample. They then increase in the aftermath of March 2,
2020, when Argentina hires Bank of America and HSBC as underwriters in its
debt restructuring and contracts with Lazard Freres as financial adviser until the
first debt proposal is put forward by the government on April 21, 2020. This
increase makes sense since one would expect to see investors lower their
expected returns upon news that the sovereign was making concrete plans to
restructure its debt.
Spreads then remain at high levels for about one month, until the government
submits the second proposal on May 28, 2020, after negotiations with creditors.
This proposal reduces the moratorium period on interest payments from three—
as in the first proposal—to two years. Given that investors are now expecting to
receive the higher recoveries they had demanded, and there is a reduced need for
Argentina to ask for the restructuring of its debt, it makes sense that spreads
would reduce.49 From then onwards, bond valuations remain fairly stable once
the third and fourth, and final, debt proposals are submitted to iron out final
details.
Now, once the restructuring is done, we should expect the prices to be stable,
since there is no immediate new risk of a restructuring. After all, Argentina’s
interest payments on the bonds have been pushed out for a number of years as a
result of the 2020 restructuring.50 And, indeed, we do see a stable period of a
couple of months up to October 2020.
But then uncertainty hits, in the form of tensions between Argentina and its
Official Sector lenders: particularly with the IMF, with Argentina owing it around
$44 billion.51 On October 5, 2020 President Fernandez says he’s seeking an
agreement with the IMF “as soon as possible” in order to “clear up any doubts.”52
The fact that Argentina needs a new debt deal with the IMF comes as something
of a shock to players in the bond market since the IMF, as a matter of long-

49. For a discussion of concerns about opportunistism in this context, see Scott Squires & Jorgelina
Do Rosario, Argentina Says 99% of Sovereign Debt Restructured in Swap, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-31/argentina-says-99-of-sovereign-debt-wasrestructurued-in-swap?sref=wvo74VD0 [https://perma.cc/E8N7-EQPQ] (estimating that creditors
received approximately $13 billion more from Argentina, after negotiations which then reduced the
likelihood of holdouts).
50. Id.
51. Pablo Guidotti, Argentina on the Brink, Again, OMFIF (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.omfif.org/2020/10/argentina-on-the-brink-again/ [https://perma.cc/CZ6W-BYGQ].
52. See Manuel Leon Hoyos, Argentina’s Path to Debt Relief From Private Creditors, YALE SCHOOL
OF MANAGEMENT (Dec. 1, 2020), https://som.yale.edu/blog/argentina-s-path-to-debt-relief-fromprivate-creditors [https://perma.cc/32JU-YAR4] (explaining the timeline).
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standing practice—providing concessional financing at low rates to countries in
crisis—does not restructure its debts. And without IMF assistance, Argentina will
be back in crisis—despite the maturities of private bonds having been pushed out
in time. Bond spreads quickly widen, possibly anticipating a replay of the
Argentina–IMF drama witnessed in 2002–04. At the beginning of May, 2021
President Fernandez embarks on a European tour seeking support for his
country in talks over a new IMF deal and to delay repayments with the Paris Club
group of lenders. On May 14, 2021 the IMF managing director, Kristalina
Georgieva, states that she had “a very positive meeting with President Alberto
Fernández . . . . Our objective remains helping Argentina build a prosperous
economic future for all.”53 This seems enough to calm bond markets as spreads
gradually decrease thereafter.

53. INT’L MONETARY FUND, STATEMENT BY IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR KRISTALINA
GEORGIEVA ON ARGENTINA (May 14, 2021),
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/05/14/pr21130-argentina-statement-by-imf-managingdirector-kristalina-georgieva [https://perma.cc/JQ28-TNYY].
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Figure 2. Bond spreads/2. Spreads on Kirchner (dark grey) and Macri (light grey) bonds.
Moving average of daily bond spreads, averaged across bond indentures, using two lagged
terms, two forward terms and the current observation. Vertical lines correspond to the
salient dates reported in Table A1.

Our primary interest though, more than overall movements in the spreads, is
the relative pricing of the Kirchner versus the Macri bonds, because that
potentially reveals the effect of variation in contract—CAC—terms. One
common strategy to understand whether bonds are correctly priced is to compare
their yields to those that are predicted by yields on other bonds—typically,
constant maturity plain vanilla bonds issued by the same sovereign—together
with a curve-fitting method.54 Systematic differences between actual and
interpolated bond yields would be informative about mispricing. In our context,
deviations from predicted bond yields—or spreads—would be informative of a
pricing effect associated with the bond terms—Macri versus Kirchner. Such an
exercise is however not feasible in our case given the scarcity of plain vanilla
Argentine debt securities we can use to predict the yields of our bonds. We
therefore conduct our (mis)pricing analysis in relative terms. That is, we compare
Kirchner and Macri bond valuations.
Evidence of the pricing effect associated with the difference in bond contract
terms comes from Figure 3, where we plot the average spread differential

54. See CHOUDHRY et al., supra note 47, at 176–85. For the relation between curve-fitting average
pricing errors in U.S. treasuries and aggregate (il)liquidity, see Grace X. Fu, Jun Pan & Jiang Wang, Noise
as Information for Illiquidity, 68 J. FIN. 2341, 2375 (2013) (using pricing errors as a measure of illiquidity).
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between Kirchner and Macri bonds. The traditional prediction, under the
assumption that creditors are primarily concerned about debtors
opportunistically restructuring their debt, would be that we would see the harderto-restructure bonds trade at lower spreads than the easier-to-restructure ones.
And Figure 3 shows this is indeed the case: that Kirchner—harder to
restructure—bonds trade at lower spreads than Macri—easier to restructure—
bonds for most of the sample period.
Readers may recall from the discussion in the prior Part, however, that the
pattern we see in Figure 3 is the opposite pattern from what was found in multiple
recent analyses of the debt of Euro area sovereigns. There, the easier-torestructure bonds were viewed by the market as more valuable than the harderto-restructure ones, the theory being that there was little fear among investors of
debtor opportunism in the Euro area context.55 Extra-contractual trust allayed
such concerns.
The spread differential in Figure 3 is about -300 bps before the appointment
of Bank of America and HSBC as underwriters in the Argentinian debt
restructuring. As one would expect, because this appointment indicates a high
likelihood of a restructuring, the differential then widens to about -600 bps. That
continues until after negotiations between Argentina and the creditors, and a
second and improved restructuring proposal from Argentina. At this stage, the
likelihood that the restructuring will succeed increases and the risk of holdouts
reduces, and we see that the spread differential narrows significantly, to around
+100 bps thereafter. Prior to the exchange offer, the average Kirchner-Macri
spread differential equals -320 bps—about a 15% reduction with respect to Macri
bonds trading at 20% average spreads—with a t–stat equal to -5.84.56
After the restructuring, the spread differential narrows to near zero. This
makes sense since the risk of another restructuring of the bonds, given that the
restructuring has pushed out the maturity dates on the bonds by multiple years,
should now be minimal. The differential remains in the vicinity of zero only for a
few months, however, because new uncertainties arise. Specifically, there is
uncertainty about Argentina being able to renegotiate the large amount of debt
it owes the IMF.57 By the end of January, we go back to seeing the Kirchner bonds
55. Carletti et al., supra note 25; Picarelli et al., supra note 25; Grosse Steffen et al., supra note 25.
56. We first regress the daily Kirchner-Macri spread differential on a constant term. The estimated
coefficient on the constant term therefore coincides with the average spread differential, and its t-stat
can be used to assess the statistical significance (or lack of) of such differential. Computations for the
‘typical’ t-stat assume that the error terms are uncorrelated over time. Yet, since we are dealing with
time-series (financial) data, we use a more conservative approach that is robust to the presence of
correlation in residuals. Specifically, we compute the t-stat for the constant term using five-lags (i.e. five
days) Newey-West corrected standard errors.
57. See Hoyos, supra note 52 (describing the timeline) (Authors, this footnote reference has been
adjusted, as the prior reference did not cite to a timeline—please confirm that this is the correct
reference). For discussion of some of this drama, see Benedict Mander, Argentina Damps Hope of Quick
Deal with IMF, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/660c1d46-01f3-41e3-8b6acd463a40e05a [https://perma.cc/3WWY-4DVV] (discussing Argentina’s diminished hopes of reaching a
deal with IMF); Patrick Gillespie, IMF and Argentina Find Common Ground Amid VP’s Bombshell
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having consistently lower spreads than the Macri ones—the same type of result
we saw prior to the restructuring. And that differential then widens further up to
-100 by the end of March. After the restructuring, the average Kirchner-Macri
spread differential equals -32 bps—about a 2.5% reduction relating to Macri
bonds trading at 14% average spreads—with a t–stat equal to -4.29. In other
words, at least at first cut, the CAC pricing results for Argentina’s bonds are the
flip of what we saw for Euro area sovereigns.

Remarks, BLOOMBERGQUINT (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/imf-andargentina-find-common-ground-amid-vp-s-bombshell-remark [https://perma.cc/5GJV-JWZ9] (outlining
some topics of negotiation between IMF and Argentina).
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Figure 3. Kirchner discount. Spread differentials (in bps) between Kirchner and Macri
bonds. Moving average of daily bond spread differentials, averaged across bond
indentures, using two lagged terms, two forward terms and the current observation.
Vertical lines correspond to the salient dates reported in Table A1.

Multiple factors other than differences in legal terms, however, may affect
risk and, in turn, bond valuations. Drawing from other research on bond pricing,
one might worry that differences in liquidity risk––that is, that Macri bonds are
more illiquid than Kirchner bonds, rather than in credit risk––are driving our
results.58 Figure 4 summarizes descriptive statistics—means, medians, first and
third quartile—for bond bid-ask spreads.59 While illiquidity appears directly
correlated with residual maturity after the restructuring, see Panel B, before the
restructuring it seems to be the other way round. The figure suggests that Macri
bonds are more illiquid than Kirchner bonds prior to the exchange offer, while
after the restructuring liquidity levels seem to be quite comparable across the two
groups of bonds. It is therefore not clear how liquidity risk may impact our
findings regarding the spread between Kirchner and Macri bonds.
We therefore adopt Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions—a
popular methodology to estimate parameters for asset pricing models with panel

58. For evidence that emerging countries’ sovereign bond yields reflect liquidity risk by about 25%
and credit risk by about 75%, see Saad Badaoui, Lara Cathcart & Lina El-Jahel, Do Sovereign Credit
Default Swaps Represent a Clean Measure of Sovereign Default Risk? A Factor Model Approach, 37 J.
BANK FINANCE 2392, 2402 (2013) (discussing relative risk percentages).
59. We compute a bond’s bid-ask spread as the difference between bid and ask yields (i.e., the yields
at the bid and the ask price), scaled by the mid-yield. Bid-ask spreads are winsorized, at the bond level,
at the 95% percentile.
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data—to separate bond valuations from liquidity risk.60 For every day in our
sample, we first run cross-sectional OLS regressions of bond spreads on bid-ask
spreads and a constant term. Then we obtain residual bond spreads by
subtracting predicted spreads from realized ones. Lastly, we compute the
liquidity–adjusted spread differential between Kirchner and Macri bonds taking
averages of these residuals across the two groups of bonds.
Using the bid-ask spread as the explanatory variable in our cross–sectional
regressions reveals that, consistent with term structures of yields and bid-ask
spreads in Figures 2 and 4 for our Argentinian bonds, bond spreads are positively
associated with bid–ask spreads before the exchange offer, while the association
turns negative for the after-exchange-bonds.61 Moreover, prior to the exchange,
bid-ask spreads explain a sizable portion of bond spreads until mid-March 2020—
R-squared values larger than 50%—while the explanatory power progressively
drops afterwards, reaching R-squared values of about 10% from June onwards.
After the restructuring, we observe a steady decrease in the variability of bond
spreads that is explained by the bid-ask spreads: average R-squared values larger
than 50% until the end of January 2021 and about 20% afterwards. In short, this
evidence is reassuring in that liquidity risk does not appear to be a first-order
determinant of bond spreads during times when the Kirchner-Macri spread
differential is sizable.

60. Eugene F. Fama & James D. MacBeth, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 607, 615–17 (1973).
61. The result is not reported in the tables in the paper, but available from the authors.
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Figure 4. Bid-ask spreads. The figure displays descriptive statistics of bond bid-ask
spreads: average (black circles), median, first and third quartile for Kirchner (dark grey)
and Macri (light grey) bonds. Bid-ask spreads (in %) for before exchange bonds (left
panel) and after exchange bonds (right panel).

In Figure 5, we plot the liquidity-adjusted spread differential—solid line—
together with the raw differential—dashed line—from Figure 3. The KirchnerMacri spread differential gets narrower after adjusting for liquidity risk before
the exchange: on average it equals -160 bps with a t-stat equal to -4.18. After the
restructuring, if anything, it gets wider relative to the raw spread differential: on
average it equals -38 bps with a t-stat equal to -4.78. In sum, although the
liquidity-adjusted spread differential becomes narrower overall, Kirchner bonds
continue to trade at lower spreads than Macri bonds and the different valuations
across the two groups of bonds therefore truly reflect credit risk.
For our purposes, the bottom line is clear. Whether we look at data before
the Argentine 2020 restructuring or after, the finding is that the market values
Kirchner bonds—harder to restructure—more than the Macri bonds—easier to
restructure. When we couple this with the findings in prior research on CACs,
which shows the opposite pattern for countries in the Eurozone—there, easier–
to–restructure bonds were valued more—it lends support to the conjecture that
the pricing of these contract terms is a function of not just the substance of the
contract provision, but also an expectation about how the contract clause is going
to be utilized.
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V
CONCLUSION
To conclude, we note a few matters worthy of further inquiry.
First, it is possible that our results are idiosyncratic to Argentina and to the
2020 context, which was complicated by a global pandemic. Argentina was facing
a situation where already bad economic conditions were significantly worsened
by the pandemic. That combination of these factors may have forced it to take
extreme actions. Further, the comparison we make to Euro area sovereign debt
in 2013–14 is one where the Euro area sovereigns were emerging from a crisis, as
opposed to going into one, as Argentina was in 2020.
Second, we only look at one side of the transaction. That is, whether the
debtor is more or less likely to act opportunistically vis-à-vis its creditors. But
what if the creditors are also aggressive contract readers? In our analysis, we do
not examine creditor reputations because we do not have data on who the
creditors are. We think this is appropriate because investors in the market do not
know what holdings other creditors have either, and therefore, unless this
information leaks, cannot price it in. In a world where this information leaks,
however, one would want to consider information on creditor identity as well.62
Third, there is the question of whether, and to what extent, contract law itself
ameliorates the problem of aggressive contract reading through its doctrines such
as the duty of good faith that is implicit in all contracts governed by New York
law. Judges do on occasion stretch the law to police what they see as contracting
misbehavior.63 But those instances are few and far between, when what the judge
is being asked to do is to second-guess negotiated contract language among
sophisticated commercial parties.64
62. A bond held by aggressive creditors with high quality lawyers will presumably behave differently
vis-à-vis its contract terms and that should impact the pricing of those terms. But see generally Robert E.
Scott, Stephen J. Choi, & Mitu Gulati, Anticipating Venezuela’s Debt Crisis: Hidden Holdouts and the
Problem of Pricing Collective Action Clauses, 100 B.U. L. REV. 255 (2020) (discussing why these creditors
typically have an incentive to remain hidden).
63. An example of this is Nanukali Paving v. Shell Oil, 664 F.2d 772, 805 (9th Cir. 1981), where the
court seemed willing to stretch the doctrines of interpretation quite a bit where Shell seemed to be using
the literal language of the contract to contravene the real deal. For a discussion of the case, see Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan & David Hoffman, Promises, Promises: Nanukali Paving v. Shell Oil, APPLE PODCASTS
(July 31, 2020), https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/promises-promises-nanakuli-paving-vs-shelloil/id1527875721?i=1000488225815 [https://perma.cc/4BLK-JWFG] (discussing Nanukali Paving v. Shell
Oil, 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981)).
64. Royce Barondes writes:
A number of factors . . . result in courts relying to a lesser extent on the evident purposes of
contractual provisions in interpreting corporate financing instruments. . . One consequence is
tedious literalism—hyperliteralism—may reign in interpreting corporate financing instruments.
Royce de R. Barondes, Vestigial Literalism in the Interpretation of Corporate Financing Instruments, 15
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 239, 288 (2014); Stephen J. Lubben, Protecting Ma and Pa: Bond
Workouts and the Trust Indenture Act in the 21st Century (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors)
(“Courts have been extremely reluctant to do anything other than a highly formalistic “plain meaning”
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On most occasions, as Tess Wilkinson–Ryan points out in her superb
comment, a court is likely to find that actions taken consistent with a formal
reading of the contract language will be seen as kosher.65 In this world of formal
lawyering, the “real” deal is the “paper” deal. One might even say that the
investors in Argentine bonds are the ones being cheeky by restricting Argentina
from using contractual rights that are explicit in its contract—even if neither side
was aware of them. That is not an uncommon phenomenon in a world where
parties use lengthy standard-form contracts and deals have to be done quickly.66
Wilkinson-Ryan’s framing helps sharpen the key finding in this article. At the
start of this article, we discussed how informal sanctions and legal sanctions are
generally discussed in the legal literature as substitutes. What we see here, in the
Argentine case, is how the formal and the informal can work as complements.
Specifically, the price penalty comes into play even where a legal sanction likely
would not.

analysis in corporate finance cases.”); Elisabeth de Fontenay, Complete Contracts in Finance, 2020 WIS.
L. REV. 533, 535 (2020) (“Judges tend to believe that sophisticated parties should write lengthy
agreements that explicitly provide for the parties’ conduct under every contingency, because, in their
view, such ‘complete’ contracts come closer to expressing the parties’ entire bargain.”); Diane Lourdes
Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance Jurisprudence, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1461,
1466 (2011) (“[T]he prevailing judicial decision-making approach in corporate finance finds its roots in
what this Article calls the ‘Certainty Imperative,’ . . . which, in the realm of finance and lending, is best
preserved when courts exercise considerable restraint, narrowly tailoring opinions to strict construction
and passive enforcement of contracts.”).
65. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Comment on Colla and Gulati, Cheeky Contracting, 85 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2022, at 127.
66. Id.
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VI
APPENDIX

Figure 5. Kirchner discount. Spread differentials (in bps) between Kirchner and Macri
bonds. Moving average of daily bond spread differentials, averaged across bond
indentures, using two lagged terms, two forward terms and the current observation. Raw
(dashed line) and liquidity-adjusted spread differential (solid line). Vertical lines
correspond to the salient dates reported in Table A1.
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Event
Argentina hires Bank of America and HSBC as underwriters in its
debt restructuring and contract Lazard as its financial adviser
April 21, 2020
Argentina presents its first debt proposal to the US SEC, which
includes a 3-year grace period.
May 28, 2020
Argentina submits a second proposal with a two-year grace period.
June 16, 2020
Argentina submits a third proposal.
July 6, 2020
Argentina submits a fourth proposal, a deal that Finance Minister
Guzman says won’t be improved further.
October 5, 2020
President Fernandez expects an agreement with the IMF as soon as
possible.
February 23, 2021 President Fernandez says he is working to get a deal with the IMF
over the country’s debts.
May 14, 2021
President Fernandez says he wants to reach a deal with the IMF as
quickly as possible. The Paris club declares to be willing to delay the
payment under certain conditions.
Table 2. Timeline of events.

